Digital Markets and the New Directions of Brazilian Competition Policy

02 de novembro de 2026

In recent years, the discussion on competition in digital markets has ceased to focus solely on applying the traditional tools of antitrust law. The growth of large digital ecosystems, the consolidation of platforms that operate simultaneously in different markets and control over relevant infrastructures have called for broader reflection on the instruments available to deal with forms of economic power that do not always manifest in the same way as in traditional markets.

This shift can already be seen in the work of competition authorities in different countries. The European Union adopted a specific regime for so-called gatekeepers through the Digital Markets Act. The United Kingdom created a model aimed at companies with Strategic Market Status. Germany, in turn, expanded the Bundeskartellamt’s powers to intervene against companies of paramount significance for competition across markets. Although there are important differences between these regimes, they all start from a similar diagnosis: certain characteristics of digital markets can produce positions of intermediation and dependence that call for faster and more targeted responses than those offered solely by after-the-fact enforcement against anticompetitive conduct.

In Brazil, this debate has gained institutional depth in recent years and now occupies a central place on the competition policy agenda.

Digital markets have economic characteristics that help explain this concern. Network effects can make a service more valuable as it concentrates users; economies of scale and scope favor companies capable of operating simultaneously in different markets; and control over data, operating systems, app stores, search engines or payment methods can allow certain agents to set the conditions under which other companies reach consumers.

The issue is not simply the size of these companies. In many cases, platforms come to perform intermediation functions that are essential to the functioning of entire markets. They can organize access between consumers and businesses, define rules of participation and, at the same time, compete within these very environments.

This kind of situation has become increasingly present on the Brazilian agenda. At a public hearing held by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Cade) in 2025 on the iOS and Android mobile ecosystems, participants discussed the conditions of access to operating system features and their impact on competitors. Cade later opened an administrative inquiry to investigate restrictions on access to NFC technology on Apple devices and their possible effects on alternative payment solutions.

As Data Privacy Brasil has previously discussed, cases like this help show that certain private infrastructures can play a decisive role in the entry and operation of other economic agents. This position gives the company that controls the central platform an orchestration power over the ecosystem, understood as the ability to set rules of participation, access conditions and technical standards that coordinate the activity of other agents (Jacobides; Lianos, 2021). This concept was incorporated into the opinion of Commissioner Victor Fernandes in the Apple App Store case, which highlighted the ability of an orchestrator, in this case Apple, to unilaterally change competitive conditions in adjacent markets.

The limits of an exclusively ex post approach

Traditionally, competition law acts through the analysis of specific conduct or transactions. An investigation identifies a given behavior, assesses its effects and, if an infringement of the economic order is established, applies remedies or sanctions.

This logic remains fundamental. But international and Brazilian experience has called into question whether it is sufficient in markets characterized by strong network effects, vertical integration and rapid technological change. In some of these markets, the time needed for investigation and judgment may be incompatible with the speed at which certain positions consolidate. By the time a final decision is reached, a market may already have been restructured in ways that are difficult to reverse (Cade, 2024).

This diagnosis also appeared in the Brazilian process that preceded the introduction of Bill No. 4,675/2025. The Call for Input conducted by the Ministry of Finance’s Secretariat for Economic Reforms in 2024 organized the debate around the sufficiency of the instruments currently available in the Brazilian Competition Defense System, the advisability of ex ante mechanisms and the institutional alternatives for implementing them.

Bill No. 4,675/2025 and the construction of a Brazilian model

Bill No. 4,675/2025 proposes amending Law No. 12,529/2011 to incorporate specific instruments for digital markets. Among its main innovations is the possibility for Cade to designate economic agents of systemic relevance in digital markets, on which special obligations may be imposed.

The proposal is therefore based on an asymmetric logic. Not every digital company would be subject to the same set of obligations. Intervention would be directed at agents with certain characteristics related to their economic position and to the structure of the markets in which they operate.

The criteria for designation include presence in multi-sided markets, network effects, vertical integration, a strategic position for third-party activities, access to large volumes of data, a significant number of users and the offering of multiple digital products or services.

This is one of the central points of the proposal. Economic power in digital markets does not always stem solely from a high share of a single, clearly defined market. It can result from a combination of different positions within an ecosystem: control of infrastructure, privileged access to data, intermediation between different groups of users and the capacity to integrate services.

For this reason, the discussion on systemic relevance seeks to look at the agent’s structural position within the digital ecosystem.

The Brazilian model also has an important institutional feature. Unlike experiences that created regimes relatively autonomous from competition law, the bill seeks to incorporate these instruments into the Brazilian Competition Defense System itself, assigning Cade responsibility for designating the agents and defining the applicable obligations.

Data Privacy Brasil has followed this discussion since the proposal was being drafted and has expressed support for the creation of specific instruments to address competition problems in digital markets. Supporting the bill, however, does not remove the need to discuss its institutional calibration, the designation criteria, the proportionality of the obligations and the mechanisms for participation and review of decisions.

Asymmetric regulation does not mean uniform regulation

International experience also shows that “ex ante regulation” does not correspond to a single model.

The European design is often used as the main reference because, with the Digital Markets Act, it created a set of obligations applicable to gatekeepers. Other countries have followed different paths, with more room for obligations to be defined on a case-by-case basis or for action by the competition authorities themselves.

The existence of international experiences makes it possible to identify recurring problems, but it does not remove the need to consider local institutional and economic characteristics. Brazil has a consolidated competition authority and its own experience in applying Law No. 12,529/2011. The challenge lies less in reproducing a foreign model and more in assessing which instruments can be incorporated into the Brazilian system without losing the capacities that have already been built.

It is also necessary to consider that digital markets do not remain static. Business models, technologies and economic positions can change quickly. Asymmetric regulation must therefore be able to identify relevant positions of power without turning regulatory categories into permanent classifications.

The very discussion on how long agents of systemic relevance should remain designated highlights this problem. As we have previously analyzed, the combination of legal certainty and the possibility of review is especially important in markets whose structure can change significantly over just a few years.

Competition, innovation and rights in the same ecosystem

The discussion on regulating digital markets is also often presented as a conflict between competition and innovation. This framing is limited.

Technology companies clearly need room to develop new products, test business models and make investments. At the same time, highly concentrated structures can reduce opportunities for innovation by smaller agents when they depend on platforms that control the conditions for entering and remaining in the market. In this sense, market contestability is also a condition for innovation.

Interoperability, non-discriminatory access to certain features and lower switching costs can expand opportunities for entry and allow new agents to compete in markets currently organized around a few platforms.

Moreover, the effects of these structures go beyond a strictly economic conception of competition. Intermediation power can affect privacy, freedom of choice, consumer protection and access to digital infrastructures.

This was the point raised by Data Privacy Brasil when discussing the restrictions on access to NFC technology and their relationship with contactless Pix. Dependence on a private infrastructure can affect competition, but it can also affect access to a digital public infrastructure that is relevant to Brazilian society.

Competition policy does not need to take on the powers of data protection, consumer protection or financial regulation authorities in order to recognize these interfaces. On the contrary, the development of digital markets makes it increasingly important to think about coordination mechanisms among authorities.

Who takes part in building these rules?

There is also a less discussed institutional dimension: the participation of the actors affected by regulation.

Decisions on interoperability, data access, payment systems, app distribution or conditions of access to platforms affect far more people than the companies directly regulated. They affect consumers, developers, small businesses, workers and other agents who depend on these infrastructures to operate.

Civil society has its own role in this debate. Organizations working on consumer protection, data protection, digital rights and freedom of expression can bring to the discussion effects that do not necessarily appear in companies’ submissions or in strictly economic analyses. In digital markets, this matters because some of the asymmetries arise from the very private rules that organize the ecosystem and from the conditions imposed by the agents that control it.

The recent experience of Bill No. 4,675/2025 shows how this debate can benefit from broader participation. Data Privacy Brasil and other civil society organizations, such as the Coalizão de Direitos na Rede (Rights in the Network Coalition), have followed the bill’s progress, submitted technical contributions and advocated for participation mechanisms in the design and application of the future regulation.

Opening up these spaces also helps reduce a concrete asymmetry in the regulatory process: large companies and business associations usually have more resources, information and advocacy capacity than other affected groups. For this reason, social participation should not be understood merely as a legitimacy mechanism, since it also contributes to the quality of the competition analysis itself.

What are the next steps?

The Brazilian debate on digital markets is thus reaching a new stage.

Over the past few years, a significant part of the institutional effort was devoted to building the diagnosis: understanding network effects, data concentration, intermediation structures and the limits of traditional instruments in the face of digital ecosystems.

Bill No. 4,675/2025 shifts this discussion to another question: which instruments does Brazil intend to adopt to respond to these problems?

This transition calls for caution. The creation of ex ante mechanisms may expand Cade’s capacity to respond, but their effectiveness will depend on the design of the procedures, the criteria used to identify agents of systemic relevance, the possibility of reviewing obligations and the institutional capacity of the competition authority itself.

It will also depend on the ability to keep this discussion open. Digital markets are structured by relationships that involve large platforms, dependent companies, consumers, workers, the State and civil society. The construction of the rules that will organize these markets must reflect this diversity of interests and perspectives.

Brazil does not need to choose between simply preserving the current model and fully reproducing foreign experiences. There is room to build a response of its own, drawing on Cade’s accumulated experience and incorporating instruments capable of addressing forms of economic power associated with ecosystems, infrastructure and digital intermediation.

This debate will be at the center of “Panel 03 – Digital Markets: Systemically Relevant Actors, Freedoms and Obligations” at the Data Privacy Global Conference (DPGC 2026), taking place on December 7 and 8, 2026, at ESPM’s Álvaro Alvim campus in São Paulo. The event will bring together representatives of government, the private sector, academia and civil society to discuss the next steps for regulating digital markets in Brazil and international experiences with asymmetric regulation.